

American and Korean
securing flight line.

A Commander in Chief Looks at East Asia

By RICHARD C. MACKE

U.S. Air Force (Paul Caron)

My priorities as Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), are *warfighting* and *people*. After all the international economic analyses, the careful political-military considerations, the strategic military planning—the fundamental business of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) is warfighting. Warfighting is readiness—our constant focus. But people are an inextricable part of that focus. It wasn't just technology, equipment, or doctrine that won the Cold War and Operation Desert Storm. It was the excellence of our people. Just as a warfighting priority drives readiness, the people priority demands quality of life.

Although these priorities may be clear, no simple, singular view of East Asia can provide a complete perspective on this complex region. East Asia is a point of convergence for the interests of major powers and still exhibits the strategic dynamics of the contingency era and the Cold War. PACOM

lies at the nexus of diplomatic and military affairs, strategic and operational concerns, and joint and service matters. In the face of such complexity, only strategy—the effective linkage of ends, ways, and means—can fully address my responsibility for applying joint forces to achieve U.S. objectives in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Intersection of Interests

East Asia has seen the intersection, not always peaceful, of the strategic interests of several major powers. As one senior regional leader quipped, "This is a tough neighborhood." Russia maintains significant regional military capabilities as it makes the transition from socialism to a market economy. Simultaneously, China is unleashing the economic energy of one-fifth of the world population and seeks to define a regional and global role commensurate with its burgeoning economy.

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Japan has increased its political clout and financial resources throughout the region and the world over a few decades. Now the second largest economy in the world, Japan is undergoing its most significant political change in 38 years, but it remains a firm treaty ally and is strategically more important than it was during the Cold War. South Korea, a thriving market economy and another close ally, is a maturing democracy. In

North Korea, the struggle of an isolated regime to survive with its military capabilities intact poses a challenge to the South and to regional stability. Strategic circumstances, however, differ fundamentally in Southeast Asia where the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has begun a multilateral security dialogue. Two members of ASEAN, Thailand and the Philippines, are U.S. allies. The combined voice of this organization gains increased attention from both regional and global audiences.

East Asia is a tough neighborhood, perhaps—but it is also a promising one. The stability made possible by decades of U.S. commitment and forward presence has generated astounding rates of economic growth. Our economy grew sevenfold over the last hundred years. Indonesia and the other Asian “tigers” will do that in a generation. East Asia offers both the greatest peril and the most promise for the Asia-Pacific region and the world.

Cold Wars versus Contingencies

As South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung Joo observed, “During the Cold War period, a fault line ran across East Asia. Now the trends of reconciliation and cooperation have replaced unproductive confrontation here and elsewhere. Every country in the region except North Korea has joined in these trends, rendering the fault line obsolete.” Obsolete perhaps, but certainly not irrelevant.

The Korean peninsula still presents the ghastly potential for high intensity conflict. If North Korea violates the armistice and breaks across the demilitarized zone (DMZ), there will be no need for a U.N. Security Council vote or chance to seek the sense of the Senate. America will be at war. Desert Storm will not be the model; thousands will die.

In addition to a classic Cold War confrontation, I face diverse contingency requirements. The PACOM area of responsibility (AOR) takes in half of the world’s surface and two-thirds of its population. The area enjoys the fastest economic growth on earth, but attendant changes could disrupt political and social orders. Together with recurring natural disasters, the regional diversity and dynamism produce an environment where crises are inevitable. PACOM must be prepared for both cold wars and contingencies, major regional conflicts and minor crisis response, forward presence and rapid reinforcement.

A Matter of Perspective

East Asia has lacked a convergent perception of threat—the traditional cause of multilateral security arrangements. Therefore it does not have (and probably does not need) comprehensive, NATO-like institutions. But interest is rising in sub-regional, multilateral security dialogues based on mutual interests rather than common perceptions of threat. Such developments have a long way to go before taking shape, and in the meantime the lack of a multilateral security organization puts CINCPAC at the diplomatic-military interface of many issues. Security and economic concerns are similarly intermingled. I tell my friends at the Department of State that total coordination and cooperation are essential for our mutual success.

Even in the military sphere my perspective must be multifaceted. I link operational goals of joint task force (JTF) commanders and General Gary Luck, commander of our forces in Korea, with the strategic goals of the National Command Authorities and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am a supported as well as a supporting CINC. I lead forward presence forces in East Asia, forward-based forces in Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska, and forces on the West Coast.

Many have characterized PACOM as a maritime theater. Although my largest component force is Navy, this is more than a

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Royal Cambodian soldiers drilling.

U.S. Army (Romona E. Joyce)

maritime theater. Air forces offer great flexibility in overcoming the tyranny of distance in this huge AOR; but this is not an air theater. It includes the seven largest armies in the world; however, this is not a land theater—or an amphibious theater, even though I command two-thirds of the active combat power of the Marine Corps. PACOM is a joint theater.

How should one begin to look at this mosaic of interests, perspectives, and considerations? The answer is through the lens of strategy—the effective linkage of ends, ways, and means.

Ends, Ways, and Means

Ends. There is no confusion over strategic ends in East Asia. Our current national security strategy of engagement and enlargement enhances U.S. security, promotes prosperity at home, and extends the community of free market democracies. President Bill Clinton made his first overseas trip to Japan and Korea where he outlined a vision of a Pacific community built on shared strength, prosperity, and commitment to democratic values and ideals. He delineated clear security priorities for a new Pacific community:

- ▼ a continued American military presence in the Pacific
- ▼ stronger efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- ▼ new regional security dialogues
- ▼ support for democracy and more open societies.

Our commitment to the region and its stability is unequivocal. As the President has stated: “America is, after all, a Pacific nation . . . America intends to stay.” In peace we seek to promote stability throughout the region; in crisis we seek to deter violence and promote cooperation; and, in the event of war, we would seek swift and decisive victory.

Means. The means to achieve these ends include more than 330,000 soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen of PACOM’s unified armed forces. We employ not only forces, but also diplomatic and defense programs, funds, and activities to engage nations in the AOR.

Ways. PACOM has three principal ways to apply the available means to achieve our strategic ends.

▼ *Forward presence.* If we are not forward in the Pacific, we can’t engage and participate. If we don’t participate, we have no influence. Our forward presence is the linchpin of our Pacific strategy. There’s no better way to demonstrate U.S. commitment than to station and deploy American men and women in the region.


▼ *Strong alliances.* Five of the seven U.S. mutual defense treaties currently in force are in the PACOM AOR—a solid guarantee and foundation of regional stability.

▼ *Crisis response capabilities.* Commitment without capability is hollow. Ready, effective military capabilities are essential as tools of engagement and response.

The PACOM theater military strategy of cooperative engagement takes advantage of every recognized role for military forces, including compellence, deterrence, and reassurance.

Compellence in War. Applying military power to make people do things—by violence or threat of violence—is known as compellence. The American way of war is swift, decisive victory, employing every available capability of the joint combat team. It depends on ready military capabilities applied in close coordination with our diplomatic and economic means. The Korean peninsula remains a potential arena for the application of PACOM forces in their compellence role. General Luck leads the effort there with our inseparable ally, the Republic of Korea (ROK). I have the greatest confidence in the U.S.-ROK combined team. PACOM would work closely with General Luck and our friends in the region to coordinate the flow of forces to Korea

Two-Tiered Command and Control



and the supporting political, economic, and military activities of off-peninsula forces. Our war plans for Korea are solid—studied and refined to the highest levels of detail. Our fervent hope is that operation plans will never become operation orders. But commanders and staffs of the Joint Staff, PACOM, and U.S. Forces Korea have totally met their obligation to prepare for war.

Deterrence in Crisis. Although we must be prepared for war, it is far better to deter a potential enemy or defuse a developing crisis. The basis for deterrence is the same: a ready, agile, joint military capability—both forward and reinforcing. The Asia-Pacific region, interestingly, has been the setting for some painful lessons in the art of joint warfare in the past. We

do not intend to relearn the lessons of history. A single-service staff cannot masquerade as a joint staff. Crises must be managed with increased speed and efficiency—and with total joint teamwork.

Pacific Command has thus adopted a two-tiered command and control concept, whereby a JTF reports directly to the unified commander (CINCPAC). These joint task

force headquarters are predesignated and undergo a focused training and exercise program. To help these service headquarters transition from their normal, service-oriented, tactical responsibilities to true joint operations, CINCPAC has developed a cadre of trained personnel, the Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC). The cell is a tailorable group of subject matter experts with communications and intelligence equipment available for air deployment on a few hours notice to augment a JTF commander's staff. This group of 20–60 officers and enlisted from the PACOM staff and service components are experienced in crisis action planning, joint operations, and a wide range of warfighting skills. They participate in initial PACOM headquarters planning for a crisis and then carry that knowledge to the JTF commander. Members of the group are neither helpers nor note takers from higher headquarters. Once the cell reports to the JTF commander, he owns them. JTF commanders who use this type of cell consider it critical to successful JTF operations.

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Two-tiered command and control and DJTFAC are good concepts—but useless unless we exercise them. We've done exactly that 31 times over the last three years in either real-world crises or exercises. Each of the predesignated JTF headquarters is exercised at least twice a year. I take care to participate personally in these exercises, and the JTF commanders and I get together at least once a year to discuss warfighting issues and our joint exercise program.

Reassurance in Peacetime. As Sir Michael Howard noted in "Lessons of the Cold War," reassurance is a military function that we recognize less easily than deterrence or compellence. Reassurance is the use of military power to engage others through peacetime military activities such as combined exercises, port visits, humanitarian assistance, or search and rescue exercises.

where China goes, so
goes the future of Asia

Through these diverse peacetime military activities, reassurance creates a general sense of mutual security that is not specific to any particular threat or scenario. We reach out to each other in military-to-military contacts and relations. We maximize the transparency of our capabilities and intentions. By taking advantage of such training opportunities, we increase our ability to cooperate in times of crisis. Working together, we sustain the conditions of stability necessary for prosperity and democracy.

A tally of some of the PACOM peacetime military activities gives one an idea of the dimensions of this endeavor. In FY94, those activities included:

- ▼ 325 bilateral exchange and training programs
- ▼ reciprocal exercise and small unit exchange programs supporting 155 joint and combined exercises and treaty obligations
- ▼ 77 humanitarian and civic assistance programs in 23 countries
- ▼ 606 port visits in 25 countries
- ▼ 411 staff talks with the ministries of defense and services of 28 nations
- ▼ 18 conferences promoting the professional development of officers and militaries that are nonpolitical, obedient to the rule of law, and respected by society (over a thousand representatives, the future military leadership of 36 Asia-Pacific nations, participated).

While the activities of reassurance may seem peripheral to the more traditional missions of deterrence and compellence, they are in fact closely associated since reassurance activities generate the conditions of stability—conditions that preclude the need for warfighting. This stabilizing role of peacetime military activities is the basis of the U.S. transition to a strategy of engagement. Reassurance will be one of the fundamental roles for military forces in the Asia-Pacific region. But reassurance does not negate the need for capabilities of deterrence and compellence. Without the capability to prevail in war, our ability to reassure is compromised. Therefore we must resist any temptation to build forces solely for reassurance.

The Way Ahead

The United States will continue to pursue a strategy of cooperative engagement throughout East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. In every country I have visited the primary concern is, "Will America stay?" It is in our interest and that of the countries of the region that we remain engaged.

Japan. Our alliance with Japan is a linchpin of stability in Asia. Continued American guarantees and close cooperation with Japan underscore our commitment to the doctrine of forward engagement on a global scale. We enjoy an extraordinary strategic situation in which the security interests of the number one and number two global economic powers are inextricably linked. Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating once remarked that this arrangement has "bought a lot of stability." Security guarantees to Japan, embodied in the forward presence of 47,000 American service men and women, immeasurably advance U.S. strategic interests in the region. Japan, meanwhile, demonstrated that our security relationship transcends government transitions, with Socialist Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama acknowledging the constitutionality of the Japanese Self Defense Force and the requirement for the U.S.-Japan security relationship. That security guarantee is an indispensable, stable foundation as the United States and Japan work together, as Ambassador Walter Mondale puts it, "to put our economic relationship on as firm a footing as our political and strategic relationships."

China. Where China goes, so goes the future of Asia. We cannot ignore a country



Russians and
Americans on
Malamute DZ.

U.S. Army (Robert Ryan)



Combat Camera Imagery (Raymond T. Conway)

Australian F/A-18
during Pitch Black '93.

with more than one-fifth of the world's population, intercontinental nuclear weapons, a veto in the U.N. Security Council, and one of the most dynamic economies in the world. All the countries of this region watch China closely. Is China a threat? A threat is composed of capabilities and intentions. Everything we know today tells us that improved Chinese capabilities are highly probable. The key is their intentions. If China wants to be a contributing member of the community of Asia-Pacific nations dedicated to advancing regional stability, then all of our efforts will be easier. The key is to engage the Chinese so they will work with us to maintain stability.

We have overcome the diplomatic hurdles of the last year and are advancing our program of cooperative engagement with China. There have been a number of visits at the senior level including a recent trip by the Secretary of Defense. We are working our contacts with the Chinese in a deliberate fashion. Both parties are learning, enhancing

the transparency of our relationship, and addressing basic questions on roles, doctrines, and strategies. In short we are reassuring each other, a process of cooperative engagement that holds great promise for furthering the stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

Russia. After a lifetime preparing for military deterrence or compellence vis-à-vis Soviet military forces, it is encouraging to see our relationship with Russia move to a new phase where our military activities advance mutual reassurance. PACOM has conducted the first combined exercises with the Russians, a series of search and rescue exercises that began last year. Two have been very successfully completed and a third including Canadian forces is scheduled for March. In June 1994 an amphibious exercise, Cooperation From the Sea in Vladivostok, featured a Marine company and its Russian naval infantry counterpart in an amphibious disaster relief scenario. A Russian Federation Army squad visited and trained with a battalion of the 6th Infantry Division in early September. PACOM and Russia maintain a Far East Field Grade (O-6) Working Group to develop cooperative engagement activities that reinforce mutual, long-term trust and confidence.

Korea. There are two dimensions to the Korea story. In South Korea we have a long-term ally that has become a mature democracy and achieved economic prosperity, a success story for U.S. forward presence and commitment. Our security commitment to



Rangers boarding Thai helicopter during Cobra Gold '94.

U.S. Army (Brian Gavin)

Korea is solid, irreversible, and a linchpin to stability on the peninsula. North Korea presents an altogether different picture: we are a long ways from reassurance in the cooperative engagement sense with North Korea. But the October 1994 agreement regarding its nuclear program may be the first small step in that direction. We are hopeful that as North Korea's power transition unfolds, we will see a regime committed to policies that offer promise for the future. With patience and close coordination with our allies, I am optimistic that we can move from the requirements of military deterrence to military reassurance on the Korean peninsula.

Multilateral Military Activities. As outlined in President Clinton's trip to Asia, one of the administration's security priorities is to advance new regional security dialogues. The Asia-Pacific area is cautiously examining regional dialogues such as the ASEAN Regional Forum. PACOM will advance regional security dialogues by seeking opportunities for multilateral military activities that supplement our current bilateral relationships. Combined training, seminars, planning arrangements, or exercises reinforce transparency and mutual confidence by allowing nations of the region to advance their common security interests through reassurance rather than reaction to perceived threats. We are content to proceed in incremental steps, perhaps starting with small sub-regional arrangements, advancing at a rate with which

our partners in the Asia-Pacific region are comfortable.

C⁴I Innovations. The way ahead must include further command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C⁴I) innovations. Without effective C⁴I, training and operations are not feasible—in East Asia or anywhere else in my AOR. PACOM maintains an integrated view of C⁴I, the key to which continues to be effective partnerships with:

- ▼ government agencies to develop leading-edge technologies (PACOM will host DOD's Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration for FY95)
- ▼ component commands (the Theater Convergence Oversight Board will continue to direct efforts to enhance the convergence of all C⁴I systems throughout the theater)
- ▼ countries in the AOR (our Combined Interoperability Program is expanding its focus through numerous memoranda of understanding).

To stay on the leading edge of technology, we are prepared to take some risks. It's O.K. to "build a little, test a little," even "falter a little," but with full interoperability as the one inviolable criterion. The operational and strategic payoffs of effective C⁴I are immense.

Training Efficiencies. No amount of technology or restructuring will obviate the need to train for war, but resources for training execution will be limited. Thus training efficiency must be improved. In PACOM we continually review our Exercise Road Map, looking for opportunities to bring service training requirements under the umbrella of joint exercises. We extend that analysis to combined exercise requirements, looking for ways to capture combined training opportunities and requirements while simultaneously meeting service and unified command needs. This is an area where we have great hopes for our increased emphasis on multilateral military activities. The Chairman has laid out a challenge to have joint training meet the high standards we currently set for service training. We intend to meet this challenge through careful planning, close coordination, and a judicious balance of distributed simulations—headquarters and field exercises that get the maximum out of our precious training dollars and our service members' valuable time.

PACOM has a mature program of joint procedures and training. We've been at the

warfighting and people
are job one

joint training business for some time and have learned some valuable lessons. We've learned that we must carefully balance the number of pre-designated CJTF headquarters against the available training resources and the personnel turnover cycles for those headquarters. We've learned that careful and continuous long-range coordination with the service components is essential. And we've learned that an up-front investment in adequate exercise simulations—and an adequate C⁴I network to support the distributed conduct of those simulations—is essential.

As ACOM assumes a greater role in joint training, we are working closely with that unified command to both share lessons learned and coordinate our efforts.

Warfighting and People. Warfighting and people, my command priorities, are job one. In a time of shrinking defense resources, I increasingly find myself in the business of supporting and coordinating service requirements within the PACOM AOR. Beyond synchronizing service, joint, and combined training, I play a role in identifying the impact of Base Realignment and Closure decisions. PACOM is also an active participant in the important work of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). As the JROC process develops, we are approaching the level of total service integration envisioned by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, to the benefit of our people, our readiness, and our country.

A Pacific Nation

The PACOM theater military strategy of cooperative engagement enables me to link ends, ways, and means and to maintain multiple perspectives on East Asia and the entire AOR. In the final analysis, however, only one perspective matters—the perspective of the American people. Asians worry about this. They know that American presence and commitment have made their emerging prosperity possible. They are glad to hear our government assure them we intend to stay. But they worry about the perspective of the American people. Does America have the will and the resources to continue its extraordinary contribution to regional peace and stability? Will America forget the Asia-Pacific region?

America will not forget, because its commitment is based on its best interests. The Nation understands that its economy is poised to participate in the extraordinary economic growth of the Asia-Pacific region—a growth we helped make possible. America understands the burdens and the benefits of global leadership. The United States has a long history of Asia-Pacific engagement and will not forget that it has lost more than 100,000 sons and daughters in three Pacific wars in this century. America is and will remain a Pacific nation. **JFQ**

The Rationale for Continued U.S. Forward Presence in Asia

U.S. military forward presence in the Asia-Pacific region is an essential element of regional security and America's global military posture. Forward deployed forces in the Pacific ensure a rapid and flexible worldwide crisis response capability; discourage the emergence of a regional hegemon; enhance our ability to influence a wide spectrum of important issues in the region; enable significant economy of force by reducing the number of U.S. forces required to meet national security objectives; overcome the handicaps of time and distance presented by the vast Pacific Ocean; and demonstrate to our friends, allies, and potential enemies alike a tangible indication of [U.S.] interest in the security of the entire region.

—Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs,
United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region
(February 1995)